The price for Ja Morant doesn’t fall to Tree Young levels

at first glance, I Morant and Tree Young seems to occupy similar territory in NBA trade deadline discourse. Both are former franchise cornerstones who have seen their value complicated by on-field results and off-field considerations. Both also play for teams hovering in the middle of their conference races, but the similarities end there. The basic economics it faces stuck Memphis Grizzlies and Atlanta Hawks are fundamentally different, which is why Zach Kleiman can’t afford to sell low on Morant the way Bryson Graham might feel forced to with Young.

Both are explosive scorers capable of swinging on their own, but their teams, the Hawks (17-21) and Grizzlies (15-20), sit precariously in 10th place in their respective conferences. Atlanta’s problem is mostly financial and contractual. Young is due $45.99 million this season, followed by a player option worth $48.9 million next year. For rival front offices, that structure is problematic on multiple levels.

The true cost of a star in the modern NBA is measured not only by salary, but also by the length of rope he gives the front office to build a contender, and how quickly that could slip out of their hands. Teams trying to avoid the luxury tax or the first apron must weigh not only the current challenge of matching salaries, but also the risk that Young could opt out this summer. In that scenario, the trading partner would hand over a substantial asset for what might amount to a four-month lease.

Even if Young makes up his mind, the long-term outlook is dire. He is expected to ask for an extension in the range of $50 million to $60 million per year over four years. That kind of commitment reshapes the franchise’s entire framework and narrows roster flexibility under the league’s new collective bargaining agreement.

The Hawks, who are four games out of fifth place and face a legitimate risk of falling out of the Play-Ins altogether, feel real pressure to act. Standing risks losing your strength. Acting decisively risks selling at a discount. That’s the corner Atlanta has painted itself into with Young.

Memphis does not face the same structural pressure. Morant’s $39.44 million cap hit this season is significantly lower, and more importantly, he’s under contract through the 2027-28 season. His future cap hits of $42.16 million in 2026-27 and $44.88 million in 2027-28 are far more manageable compared to projected cap growth. For the front office, those numbers matter. It allows for multi-year planning, sequencing of extensions, and deliberate rostering instead of reactively shuffling funds.

Yes, Morant’s play was subpar by his own standards, and that diminished his perceived value. This is precisely why Memphis cannot afford to sell low. The Grizzlies would monetize an asset at its weakest point, not because of age or contract risk, but because of context. Tuomas Iisal’s team is broken, shortened and rarely whole. The team’s current position of 10th is more reflective of exhaustion than a collapsed competitive window.

Equally important, the external pressure is simply non-existent. Western Conference teams lurking behind the Grizzlies and not putting together a coordinated attack. The Utah Jazz, Dallas Mavericks, New Orleans Pelicans and LA Clippers looked overmatched over the long haul. Memphis may be stuck at No. 10, but it’s not actively being hunted. That absence of urgency preserves electability.

Market reality is also at play. A younger superstar under long-term control at a relative sub-max salary is a fundamentally different trade chip than an often-used guard approaching a potential bounce and mega-extension. Even with the questions surrounding Morant, the Grizzlies know time is on their side. Improved health, internal development, or simply a cleaner part of the games can recalibrate his value without any front-office gymnastics.

In contrast, the Hawks are working against time. Young’s contract timeline, combined with weak playoff positioning, makes for uncomfortable decisions sooner rather than later. The risk of retention and loss of leverage is real in Atlanta. For Memphis, that risk is minimal. Selling Morant low would not be strategic flexibility. That would be self-inflicted harm. Frankly, unless Morant is forcing the issues and asking, the logic for a discounted exit just isn’t there.